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Abstract
Theories of both distributive (Adams, 1963) and procedural justice
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975) have been demonstrated to be accurate in
describing subjective evaluations of fairness in a wide variety of
circumstances.

However, a phenomenon known as the frustration

effect (e.g. Folger, 1977) results in perceptions of fairness that
are incongruent with the predictions of these two theories.

This

study attempts to explain the discrepant results in terms of
attribution theory as it was proposed by Weiner (1985).

By

manipulating and measuring the attributions made by subjects, the
attributional explanation was tested.

The results of this

experiment were not supportive of this theoretical perspective,
but several methodological factors may have hampered this attempt.
The results and methodological difficulties encountered in this
experiment are discussed in terms of their implications for future
studies of the frustration effect.

vii

1
Perceptions of Fairness in the Frustration Effect:
An Attributional Analysis
Previous research has demonstrated that perceptions of
fairness have a significant impact on the efficient functioning of
and satisfaction with organizational and societal institutions
(Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Friedland, Thibaut, & Walker, 1973;
Thibaut, Friedland, & Walker, 1974; Tyler, 1987).

These fairness

evaluations are influenced by two different factors: the equity of
the outcomes (distributive justice) and the appropriateness of the
procedures that are used in arriving at these outcomes (procedural
justice).

While more equitable outcomes and more appropriate

*

procedures normally result in increased evaluations of fairness,
sometimes this combination actually results in lower evaluations
of fairness (see Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 180).

Attempts to explain

these divergent results have not netted an all-encompassing
explanation of these varying perceptions of fairness.

The

following is a recapitulation of the research associated with
psychological reactions to fairness, and a presentation of recent
research that provides new insight into factors that may moderate
the effect of the outcomes and procedures on perceptions of
fairness.
Distributive Fairness
Historically, much of the research that dealt with the issue
of fairness focused on the appropriateness of varying outcome
levels for different individuals.

Adam's (1963) formulation of

equity theory highlighted the importance of both inputs and
outcomes as the basis for judging the fairness of differing
allocation decisions.

Inputs are defined as the perceived

contributions of a person into a system or relationship.

Outcomes

are the things the person' receives from the relationship or
system.

Within the framework of this theory, individuals evaluate

their input/outcome ratio against the input/outcome ratio of a
social referent.

The system is fair when the ratio of inputs and

outcomes for the two individuals is equal.
Equity theory suggests that people utilize a model of
fairness which focuses on the purely distributive dimension,
looking only at relative inputs and outcomes to determine whether
or not justice has been served.

With such a narrow focus, equity

theory does not take into account the procedures by which outcomes
are decided (Folger, 1986b).

If an evaluation of the procedures

did not take place and equity were the sole basis on which
fairness was determined, each situation might require an analysis
of the relative inputs and outcomes of each individual to
determine whether everyone was being treated equitably.

If this

were the case, the evaluations would require a vast amount of
information to be assimilated and, as such, would be an extremely
inefficient way to evaluate fairness.
Procedural Fairness
In what has become a monumental series of studies in justice '
research, Thibaut and Walker (1975) studied the importance of
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outcome decision procedures on perceptions of fairness.

By

manipulating both the outcomes received and the process by which
the outcomes were determined, they demonstrated that procedures
affect perceptions of fairness.

Thus, in addition to evaluations

of the input vs outcome ratios, the evaluation of procedures
leading to outcome decisions is also an integral element of
judgements of fairness.
with empirical evidence that evaluations of fairness occur on
both procedural and distributive dimensions, subsequent research
has routinely measured these dimensions independently.

Evaluation

of the fairness of procedures used to determine outcomes is
labeled procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), and
evaluation of the fairness of outcomes is labeled distributive
justice (Homans, 1961).
An illustration may prove useful in clarifying these two
dimensions.

Imagine that you have been wrongly accused of

plagiarizing and have the option of either pleading guilty or
defending yourself in front of a review board.

After preparing a

statement to defend your innocence, you show up on the morning of
the hearing only to be told that the charge has been dismissed.
This verdict was reached prior to any opportunity to make
statements in your defense.

Upon further inquiry, you find that

accusations are routinely dropped for those who take the time to
prepare a case.

The logic presented is that you must be innocent

if you took the time to prepare a case and are ready to present it
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to the board.
From a purely distributive standpoint, justice has been
served; you have not been convicted of something of which you are
innocent.

If evaluations of fairness rested solely on this

dimension, any skepticism about fairness could not be based on the
actual outcome received.

On the other hand, it is possible that a

great deal of skepticism would follow procedures that resemble the
above scenario.

The procedures that were followed in determining

your outcome, although leading to a verdict that happened to be
correct, do not guarantee a just outcome will always be reached.
Because no confidence in these procedures exist, the fairness of
each outcome would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Procedural Justice Effects
How does procedural justice affect perceptions of
distributive justice? Several studies (La Tour, 1978; Lind, Kurtz,
Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut,
1974) have analyzed this relationship by varying the procedures
used and the outcomes received.

Results indicate that fairer

procedures resulted in higher ratings of distributive justice,
even if the two different procedures resulted in identical
outcomes.

The bottom line of these experiments is that

satisfaction with the outcomes was improved merely by using better
procedures (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

Increasing the outcomes,

therefore, is not a prerequisite to improving perceptions of
distributive justice.
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The implications of procedural fairness are best exemplified
in two studies that contrasted the effects of varying procedures
and outcomes.

In a study of leadership endorsement, Tyler and

Caine (1981) manipulated both outcomes and procedures and examined
whether distributive or procedural fairness played a more
important role in the support given to formal leaders (e.g. school
teachers and politicians).

While perceptions of distributive

justice were important, perceptions of procedural justice
accounted for a significantly greater percentage of the variance •
in ratings of leadership support.
Tyler and Caine provided additional support for their
findings in a field study examining these same variables.

In this

latter study, the impact of procedural factors was even more
dramatic.

The regression coefficients linking perceptions of

distributive justice to leadership support for various political
figures generally were not statistically significant.

In

contrast, the regression coefficients linking perceptions of
procedural justice to leadership support were significant
accounting for 11 to 22 percent of the variance.
It is also important to note that the impact of procedural
justice is greatest in cases where individual outcomes are
negative.

Research associated with attribution theory has

demonstrated that decisions having a personal impact make
individuals sensitive to the process by which the decisions are
made, especially when the outcomes are negative or unexpected
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(Weiner, 1985, 1986; Wong & Weiner, 1981).

While, in general,

studies have demonstrated that fairer procedures result in greater
outcome satisfaction (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), the evaluations
associated with negative outcomes should make subjects especially
sensitive to the types of procedures used (Lind & Tyler, 1988,
p.186).
Empirical evidence exists supporting this hypothesis (Folger,
1986a; Folger & Martin, 1986).

When outcomes are negative, the

legitimacy of the process leading to the outcomes must be
maximized if perceptions of justice are to be maintained (Bies,
1987).

When the procedures are perceived to be fair, the system

enjoys a cushion of support (Greenberg & Folger, 1983; Lind &
Tyler, 1988, p.67), even in the face of negative outcomes.
Investigating what factors contribute to the cushion of support is
at the center of much of the procedural and distributive justice
research.
Voice
By implementing a remarkably simple procedure called voice,
the cushion of support is normally attained.

This procedure

involves allowing individuals the opportunity to express their
opinion or concerns in an effort to influence a decision in which
they have an interest (Greenberg & Folger, 1983).

Simply

providing interested individuals with an opportunity for voice
improves their perceptions of procedural justice (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975).

This improvement is labeled the fair process
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effect (Greenberg & Folger, 1983).
The original definition proposed by Greenberg and Folger
(1983) implies that influence over the outcomes is important if
perceptions of procedural justice are to be enhanced.

Recent

evidence indicates that the perception of influence over the
outcome may not be that important.
Components of Voice
For purposes of studying the effect of voice on perceptions
of fairness, a distinction has been made between voice which is
merely expressive and that which is instrumental (Tyler, Rasinski,
& Spodick, 1985),

The expressive value of voice is nothing more

than being able to express an opinion regardless of its perceived
effect on the-outcomes.

In contrast, the instrumental value of

voice is linked to the perception that expression will somehow
lead to a fairer outcome (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
while it has been demonstrated that the instrumental aspect
of voice is important (Tyler et al., 1985), the value expressive
component also affects perceptions of fairness (Earley, 1984;
Earley & Lind, 1987; Tyler 1987, 1989).

Just being allowed the

opportunity to express an opinion has value over and above the
perception of how much influence.voice has on those outcomes.
In fact, the value expressive component of voice is so
important that even in situations where it is clear that
expressing an opinion will have no impact on the outcomes, ratings
of procedural justice still improve compared to situations in

which voice is not allowed (Earley, 1984).

In a study testing

this effect, subjects were told that their outcomes were already
decided and the decision was final.

Nonetheless, subjects were

given an opportunity to express their opinion after the outcomes
had been announced, even though they knew their expressions .would
not alter the decision.

With clear evidence that their voice did

not represent an opportunity to influence the outcomes, subjects
given voice still rated the procedures as more fair than did
subjects who were not provided the opportunity for voice.
In contrast to earlier definitions of voice as an attempt to
influence outcomes (Greenberg & Folger, 1983), the value
expressive component appears to be a significant factor in the
effect voice has on perceptions of fairness.

Regardless of what

factors contribute to increases in perceptions of fairness, the
fair process effect associated with voice is one of the more
robust findings in the domain of justice research (Lind & Tyler,
1988, p.179).
Referent Cognition Theory
In an effort to integrate the research on distributive and
procedural justice, Folger (1986b; Folger & Martin, 1986)
formulated referent cognition theory.

This theory encompasses

both distributive and procedural justice.

From a distributive

justice standpoint, it is suggested that outcomes are evaluated on
how closely they resemble the evaluator's perceptions of an
equitable solution.

In the same manner, the procedures are
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evaluated against what is perceived as the most appropriate
procedure for the given situation.

As the actual outcomes and

procedures more closely approximate the perceptions of that which
is fairest, referent cognition theory predicts that judgements of
fairness will increase.
This model suggests that the two dimensions make independent,
additive contributions to evaluations of fairness.

If this is

correct, situations in which the procedures are held constant and
the outcomes are changed so they become more equitable should
result in higher fairness evaluations than situations in which the
initially inequitable outcomes are unchanged.

The same overt

procedures are maintained; thus, according to referent cognition
theory, there should be no differential contribution from the
actual procedures employed to the perceived fairness of the
outcomes.

From a distributive justice perspective, the change to

more equitable outcomes should result in improved evaluations of
fairness.
In fact, enhancement of procedural and distributive fairness
occurs when an initial inequity is corrected to meet the
evaluator's perception of equity (deCarufel & Schopler, 1979;
Folger,.1977).

However, in order for perceptions of fairness to

improve it is important that the outcome increment closely
resemble that which the evaluator thinks is fair.

If voice is

allowed, evaluations of fairness do not rise with outcome
improvement if the outcome improvement is negligible.

This
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relationship between outcome and desired outcome is only important
when the procedures allow for expression of voice (Folger, 1977).
When voice is not allowed and a slight improvement in outcomes
occurs, perceptions of fairness become a function of objective
outcome equity.
Frustration Effect
When voice is allowed but outcomes are not improved to an
equitable level, the cushion of support and the fair process
effect normally associated with voice procedures do not occur
(Conlon, Lind, & Lissak, 1989; deCarufel & Schopler, 1979; Folger,
1977).

Not only do the perceptions of procedural and distributive

justice not improve with the fairer outcomes, they actually
decrease as compared to situations where the originally
inequitable outcomes remain unaltered.

The perception of fairness

in this situation is also lower than if the outcomes were, improved
without the opportunity for voice.

This phenomenon has been

labeled the frustration effect (Folger, 1977), a label which has
been attached to situations in which perceptions of fairness do
not improve as would be expected given improvements in outcomes or
the use of more appropriate procedures.
The first and most frequently cited study of the frustration
effect was conducted by Folger (1977).

In this experiment, fifth

grade boys were asked to perform zip code sorting tasks for which
they received varying levels of reimbursement as determined by
another subject who was selected to play the role of manager.

The
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amount of reimbursement came from a fixed amount of money to be
distributed between the manager and the worker%
Prior to task performance, subjects were asked to write on a
fair payment card the proportion of each allocation they thought
would represent the fairest distribution.

The experimenter

explained that since the worker and manager were randomly assigned
to their positions, an even split of the money was usually deemed
the most appropriate.

As would be expected, almost all subjects

indicated the equal division of outcomes was fair.
payment cards were used as the mode of voice.

The fair

Subjects in the

voice condition were told the manager was given the card to read
after their second task performance session.

Those in the mute

condition filled out the cards, but were never told the manager
would read what they had written.
In addition to the procedural manipulation of voice, the
outcomes were manipulated so either the cumulative total
compensation for the manager and worker were equal, or the
cumulative total compensation for the worker was half of the
manager's compensation.

The allocations were set up on a schedule

whereby half of the subjects' outcomes remained constant for each
of the ten tasks, while the other outcomes became more equitable
for each successive task performance.

Thus, other than the voice

vs mute condition, four additional situations existed in this
experiment: constant, total equity; constant, total inequity;
improving, total equity; and improving, total inequity.
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Ratings on three categories of dependent variables were
taken: managerial fairness, procedural fairness ("How fair was it
to let your manager divide the money?"), and distributive
fairness.

As could be expected, conditions in which total

cumulative equity existed between the worker's and manager's
outcomes resulted in high ratings of managerial and distributive
fairness.

These particular results are consistent with referent

cognitions theory, and are not specifically applicable to the
frustration effect.
As would be expected on the basis of an independent
evaluation of the procedures or outcomes, subjects in the muteconstant, total inequity condition rated the manager and
distributions as less fair than did those who were in the voiceconstant, total inequity or mute-improving, total inequity
conditions.

Subjects in the voice-improving, total inequity

condition rated managerial and distributive fairness lower than
those who were in either the voice-constant, total inequity or the
mute-improving, total inequity conditions.

Given the use of

voice, which is a fairer procedure, and the improvement in
outcomes, it would' be expected that these ratings would have been
higher.

Focusing only on the conditions where voice was

contrasted with a mute condition and outcomes were either
improving or remained the same, an interaction occurred in the
voice-improving outcomes condition but not in the direction
predicted based on the improving outcomes and the use of fairer
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procedures.
Measures assessing how fair it was to allow the manager to
make the allocation decisions did not reveal the same pattern.
Instead, ratings of fairness were higher for the voice than the
mute procedures, and higher for outcome improvement than the
outcome constant conditions.

It appears that since it was the

experimenter who set up the system providing the expression of
\

voice, these ratings varied as a function of procedures
irrespective of whether or not the manager utilized voice
information.

For subjects in the voice-improving, total inequity

condition the manager is attributed with responsibility for the
decision, as is evidenced by the differential ratings between
managerial and, what is for this study, procedural justice.
These lower fairness judgements in situations of increased
equity have been .replicated elsewhere.

deCarufel and Schopler

(1979) asked subjects to perform a clerical task for which they
perceived they would be compensated at a rate determined by a
second subject.

In reality, the outcome schedule was set up with

the total cumulative outcome for each worker always equal to half
that of the allocator.
Schedules of payment varied for each condition.

Subjects in

a constant condition received approximately the same inequitable
proportion of the outcomes through each of the ten trials.

Those

in the equality condition received less than the allocator for the
first five trials, but for the second set of five trials the
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worker and allocator each received equal payments.

Finally, those

in the compensation condition received less than the allocator in
the first five trials, but more than the allocator for the five
remaining trials.
The procedures were manipulated by providing three types of
voice after the fifth trial-.

Subjects in the voice conditions

i

were allowed to pick out one of three cards that expressed either:
(1) satisfaction with the allocations, and the allocator should
keep more; (2) satisfaction with the allocations, and they should
remain the same; or (3) dissatisfaction with the allocations, and
the worker should receive more.

In addition, the tone of the

cards was altered; subjects were provided cards that either
appealed to the allocator's sense of justice, or contained a
threat suggesting that the worker would get even.

The threat and

appeal conditions were constrasted with a mute condition in which
subjects had no opportunity to convey a message to the allocator.
The first unique finding of this study, inconsistent with
previous research, is that subjects in the,voice conditions did
not rate the procedures more fair as a result of voice.

Because

subjects were allowed to pick only one card which they agreed with
the most and were not allowed to relay any of their own views, it
is possible that this voice manipulation lacks the value
expressive component of voice which later research has addressed.
The lack of a fair process effect in this experiment, while
present even when using a highly constrained voice in the Folger
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(1977) experiment, suggests that the content of voice may have
affected the results of this study.
However, the pattern of fairness ratings seen in the appeal
compensation condition, when contrasted to the appeal equity
condition, is unique to this study.

Subjects who received

outcomes that were greater than that of the allocator in the last
five trials rated satisfaction and fairness lower than subjects
whose outcomes during the last five trials were equal to that of
the allocator.

This occurred even though subjects in the

compensation condition would have reason to believe the allocator
was trying to rectify previous inequities.
deCarufel and Schopler (1979) suggest the disparate ratings
could be explained by differing perceptions of distributive
justice.

Subjects in the equality condition may have believed the

allocator was suggesting a "from now on" split of the outcomes was
fair.

Only the outcomes received after the voice card was

delivered were assessed for fairness.

In contrast, those in the

compensation condition may have believed the allocator was using
the cumulative total as a basis on which to evaluate the fairness
of the outcomes.

Thus, all the outcomes were assessed for

fairness.
With the discrepant cumulative totals between the worker and
the allocator, this explanation would appear plausible.

Subjects

in the equitable condition may have viewed the allocator as using
a standard of justice involving a "from now on" approach; thus,
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the fact that each subsequent allocation was equitable conformed
to the "from now on" standard.

In contrast, those in the

compensation condition may have viewed the allocator as using
total outcomes as the standard of justice.

When subjects faced

total outcomes that were not equitable, they felt the total
outcome standard was violated, and the ratings of fairness
reflected that fact.
This same pattern of results was not replicated in the threat
conditions.

Again, this may link back to the value expressive

component of voice.

The tone of the card, whether threat or

appeal, may have affected whether subjects felt the card
represented their own voice.

With subsequent research

demonstrating the importance of the value expressive component of
voice, those in the threat condition may not have perceived that
/

the card reflected their own position.

For those in the appeal

conditions, the card may have more closely represented their own
views.

As other factors were held constant, it would seem logical

that the divergent ratings are an artifact of the nature of the
voice.
These studies have involved the worker and the allocator in a
non-correspondent relationship (Lind & Tyler, 1988); the allocator
sacrifices what is given to the worker.

As a result of this it

could be suggested that this type of worker/manager non
correspondence may be a prerequisite to the frustration effect.
However, recent evidence suggests that this need not be the case.
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In a situation where subjects were deprived of varying
amounts of their rightful earnings from a business game/ a pattern
of fairness ratings was exhibited that matched that of the
frustration effect (Conlon et al., 1989).

The difference in this

study was that subjects no longer perceived the judge to have any
interest in the outcomes other than a fair resolution of the
conflict.
Each subject directed a group of individuals which had won a
monetary prize in a business simulation game.

After being told

they had won, they were informed their winnings were in jeopardy
because another group alleged they had violated one of the
established rules of the game.
A mock trial was arranged with subjects represented by a law
school student who presented their defense to a judge.

After the

judge heard the case, they were informed that either they had lost
the case and would lose one-third, two-thirds, or all of their
winnings, or they had won and could keep all of the total prize
money.
Similar to the pattern of ratings seen in the Folger (1977)
study, the fairness of the judge and procedures did not vary in a
simple linear fashion with the amount of the money they were
allowed to keep.

Subjects who were allowed to keep only one-third

of their winnings rated the procedures as significantly less fair
than those who were deprived of all their outcomes.
Unique to this study was the fact that there were no
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constraints placed on voice; yet, the frustration effect still
occurred.

The previous frustration effect studies have placed

tight constraints on voice, which has caused some to suggest that
this is a prerequisite to the frustration phenomenon (Lind &
Tyler, 1988, p.183).

Because subjects were active participants in

forming their own defense and felt they were well represented by
their lawyers, the necessity of a constrained voice does not
appear to be a valid prerequisite to the frustration effect.
Because the frustration effect has been used to describe
decrements in fairness ratings resulting from a variety of
situations, it is necessary to delineate a definition which
clarifies the phenomenon of interest.

For this study, the

frustration effect will be defined as low evaluations of fairness
in situations where the■procedures used and outcomes received
would be independently rated as more procedurally or
distributively fair than the actual ratings reported.

This

represents an interaction between perceptions of the procedures
and outcomes that is in the opposite direction of the expected
main effect for both variables.

This definition necessitates a

contrast of ratings between situations where the frustration
effect occurs and situations where the procedures are the same and
the outcome is less equitable, or the procedures are less fair and
the outcomes are equally equitable.
Utilizing this definition, two experiments that do not
fulfill all of the criteria, but are repeatedly-referred to as
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examples of the frustration effect, were reported by Folger,
.Rosenfield, Grove, and Corkran (1979).

In these studies subjects

were provided with two different procedures (voice vs mute) along
with social information about a co-worker's perception of the
equity of the outcomes.

For all subjects the outcomes were ■

inequitable and did not change after voice.
Subjects were told their co-workers thought the outcomes were
either equitable or inequitable, thus, agreeing or disagreeing
with the subject's perception of inequity.

When the co-worker's

opinion was that the outcomes were inequitable, the ratings of
fairness associated with the voice procedure were no higher than
those associated with the mute procedure; and in the second study,
the ratings of fairness with the voice procedure were even
slightly lower.

In contrast, when the subjects were led to

believe that the co-worker's opinion was that the outcomes were
equitable, the ratings of fairness reflected the normal fairprocess effect associated with voice procedures.
These experiments Vary in two ways from previous studies of
the frustration effect.

First, the ratings of fairness with a

voice procedure were not significantly lower than the ratings of
fairness with the mute procedure.

All of the previous frustration

effects have resulted in a significantly lower ratings of fairness
when higher ratings would be expected.

Second, it is the use of

social information (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) which causes the
ratings to differ from the normal pattern.

The previously cited
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experiments have manipulated perceptions of fairness using a
combination of procedures and outcomes.

As reflected in the

conclusion reached by Folger et al. (1979), "when supportive
social 'evidence' is available, the fairness of the allocation
procedure becomes essentially irrelevant" (p. 2259).

While social

information is important, the focus of the present research is to
investigate the role of procedures and outcomes in producing the
frustration effect.
Frustration Effect Explanations
Explanations of the frustration effect in the other
experiments have resulted in no clear cut understanding of its
cause.

Folger (1977) suggested that those in situations where

they receive improvements in outcomes after voice say to
themselves, "I could have done better," whereas, those who receive
improvements in outcomes without voice say, "I could have done
worse."
Relative to those in the mute group, those who were given the
opportunity for voice would have perceived that they were
successful in influencing the manager.

Folger suggests that this

perception of success would lead to a higher standard of
evaluation resulting in the "I could have done better
perspective." Those in the mute group simply were at the mercy of
the manager, when the outcomes spontaneously improved, it
represented good luck- rather than something that could be
expected.
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Similar to the explanation provided for the deCarufel and
Schopler (1979) study, subjects could have used a different
comparison level (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) to judge their outcomes,
when voice is allowed, those who are in the no-improvement
condition accept their stable outcomes as just, whereas, those.inthe outcome improvement condition use an equal distribution of the
outcomes as a basis for evaluating their outcomes.

The different

perspective could have resulted in either a sense of relief or
disappointment which is manifested in the differing judgements of
fairness.
These explanations, however, are weakened by the Conlon et
al. (1989) findings in which all of the subjects conceivably would
have used the same outcome standard because of their innocence in
the case.

If the ratings of fairness are a function of the

comparison level, the perceived fairness of the outcomes should
vary as a linear function of the amount of earnings retained.

As

reflected by the results of this study, this pattern of judgements
was not exhibited, calling into question the validity of this
explanation.
In the Conlon et al. study, assessment of the subject's
perception of whether or not the judge gave due consideration to
their position provides some insight into factors that contribute
to the frustration effect.

As subjects' perceptions of the

fairness of procedures varied, so did perceptions of the amount of
consideration given to their arguments.

This suggests that
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fairness perceptions are not purely a function of the procedures
or the outcomes.

A personal evaluation of Lite amount of

consideration given by the decision maker to subjects'' voiced
statements was an integral component of the ratings of procedural
justice in this study.
Because assessment of due consideration in the Conlon et al.
study was correlational, it is not clear whether due consideration
moderates perceptions of justice, or perceptions of justice
moderate due consideration.

It is clear, however, that

attributions about the decision maker covary with perceptions of
fairness.'
Attribution Theory
As stated earlier, research has demonstrated that causal
attributions are routinely made in situations where failure or
unexpected outcomes are experienced (Wong & Weiner, 198.1).

A

three-factor model of attribution theory has been developed and
verified for a variety of social situations (Weiner, 1986; Weiner,
Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).

This model makes use of judgements of

stability, controllability, and locus of causality interacting to
determine emotional reactions to a variety of social situations.
Attributions of stability are defined as the stability of-the
cause of an action by an actor.

Weiner (1985) points out that

perceptions of stability are important attributions which
influence everything from parole decisions to decisions about
whether to re-enter school.

Previous research on perceptions of
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fairness have not measured causal stability.
Subjects provided with outcomes that change will realize that
the reason for, or cause of, the outcome decision is unstable,
whether the outcomes are changed because the decision maker took
into account fluctuations in factors which affect the outcome, or
the decision maker just had a change in attitude, the perception
of causal stability will be lower.

In contrast, when outcomes do

not change, subjects are more likely to make an attribution of
causal stability.
In either case, there is no evidence that attributions of
causal stability moderate the anger experienced by individuals who
are exposed to aversive outcomes.

Although Weiner (1985) points

out that parole decisions are based on attributions of this
dimension, these decisions were tied to the anticipated re
occurrence of crimes rather than the affective reaction of
individuals making parole decisions.

From a theoretical

perspective,, attribution theory disregards perceptions of
stability in explaining anger reactions, reactions which are
assumed to be important in the frustration effect.

The pertinent

dimensions used to understand anger, along with their implications
for the frustration effect, are locus of causality and
controllability.
Locus of causality has been defined as whether the cause of
an individual's behavior is perceived as external or internal to
the actor (Weiner, 1985, 1986).

Acts performed as a reaction to
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some contextual demand are labeled as having an external locus of
causality.

Acts which are interpreted to be a result of a

personal characteristic of the actor are defined as having an
internal locus of causality.
Controllability of the act also plays a significant role in
moderating emotional .reactions.

An act performed without the

actor having control over the action is not likely to arouse the
same type of reaction as when it is clear the actor did have some
control.

For example, a student who turns in a paper one day late

is more likely to receive sympathy from an instructor if the
reason is an unavoidable illness rather than a trip to the
baseball park.

With important implications for the frustration

effect, acts which result in an internal locus of causality and
are perceived to be controllable result in feelings of anger
(Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982).
Frustration Effect Attributions
The utility of attribution theory for the area of fairness
perceptions lies in its ability to theoretically explain the
frustration effect phenomenon.

Subjects confronted with some

improvements in outcomes after pleading their case to a decision
maker make two important attributions.

First, the decision maker

clearly has control over the outcomes based on the outcome
improvements after voice.

If the allocator did not have control,

no outcome changes would have taken place.
Second, the locus of causality for the allocation is noW more
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easily attributed to an internal cause.

If the initial decision

was based on some contextual factors, it would be unnecessary to
heed the worker's voice and provide increased outcomes.

Based on

evidence that the initial allocations were not contextually based,
the worker is more likely to perceive an internal locus of
causality for the decision maker's behavior.

In this case,

outcomes that do not improve to equity will be perceived as caused
by a personal characteristic of the actor, such as greed.
In contrast, those situations where the outcomes remain
constant after voice provide no additional evidence that the
decisionmaker has complete

control over the outcomes. Had

outcomes been altered, then

it would

have been clear tothosewho

were receiving the outcomes

that the

decision maker didhave

control over how much they received. Even though subjects in

each

of the experiments were informed that the decision maker was in
control, augmenting the perception of control by improving the
outcomes may be an additional assault to further feelings of anger
toward the decision maker (Kelley, 1972).
Similarly, subjects in a voice-no improvement condition lack
further information on the locus of causality of the allocation.
Having received no improvements in outcomes, subjects are likely
to.perceive that the initial allocations are relatively fair
because they are based on some contextual factors of which they
are not aware.

What was fair before the expression of voice is

just as fair afterwards, thereby confirming any external
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attributions of causality for the decision maker's allocations.
Subject-Allocator Relationship
An attribution perspective also sheds some light on the
importance of the relationship between the decision maker and the
subject.

Given that the decision maker has an interest in the

outcomes the subject receives in a non-correspondent relationship,
a bias may exist toward perceiving that the allocations were
influenced by an internal characteristic of the decision maker
(i.e. a desire to keep as much of the allocation as possible).

In

contrast, in a judicial setting where the interest of the decision
maker is perceived to be the resolution of a conflict, the bias
toward an internal attribution of causality is not as strong,
while the pattern of attributions in both cases may be relatively
the same, the magnitude of the attributions should reflect these
biases.

This effect should also be manifested in evaluations of

fairness.
It would seem that the. frustration effect would be magnified
by the relationship between the subject and decision maker.

In a

non-correspondent relationship, evaluations of the fairness of
procedures and outcomes should be lower than when the
relationships are neutral.

This relationship should have the

greatest impact in situations where there is sufficient evidence,
that the decision maker is not giving due consideration to the
subject's perspective.

It is in this context that the search for

a cause should be the most important, and trust in the. decision
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maker should be the most suspect.

Thus, the nature of the

relationship should prove to be important.
Summary and Hypotheses
The theories surrounding perceptions of fairness have now
advanced to include both distributive and procedural factors.

It

is the combination of these two dimensions that normally
contribute to perceived fairness.

Yet one situation elicits

patterns of fairness ratings which are inconsistent with
predictions made by theories of fairness.

Recent theoretical

advances made in attributional models of achievement motivation
and emotion now provide new insights through which the frustration
effect can be viewed.
The purpose of this research was to determine how well the
attribution model explains the frustration effect.

More

specifically, an investigation was conducted on how attributions
impact perceived fairness and lead to the frustration phenomenon
in the context of voice.

Again, previous research has identified

the frustration effect only when individuals are provided voice
(Lind & Tyler, 1988).

As a result, this study examined the

effects of attributions on fairness perceptions only as they
occurred in the context of voice.
It is necessary to recall that the frustration effect is
defined as lowered perceptions of fairness accompanying slight
outcome improvements as compared to the perceptions of fairness
that accompany less equitable, but unchanged outcomes.

More
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equitable outcomes actually lead to the perception of less equity.
Thus, the manipulation of outcome change is needed to study the
variables believed to be responsible for the frustration effect.
As such, subjects were exposed to either outcomes that were held
constant or outcomes that improved slightly after they were given
an opportunity for voice.
In addition to manipulating outcomes, subjects were also
exposed to one of three different levels of feedback information
designed to impact their, attributions.

The first level of the

attribution manipulation was a partial replication of the previous
frustration effect investigations.

As in previous studies, some

subjects were provided with outcomes that improved or stayed the
same without receiving any additional attributional information.
However, subjects in the second and third attribution levels were
provided with attributional information designed to influence
their evaluations' of fairness.

Those in the second level were

told that the allocations they received were based on factors
under the decision maker's direct control.

Finally, subjects in

the final attribution condition were led to believe that the
decision maker could not control the outcomes they’ received.
Thus, the final design was a 2 x 3 incomplete factorial with
outcomes and attributional information as the independent
variables (see Figure 1).
Given the design, the hypotheses are explicated in terms of
the manipulated variables.

The first hypothesis is that subjects
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Outcome
Constant

No
-Information

Controllable
Information

Uncontrollable
Information

Figure 1.

'Experimental Design,

Improvement
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in the outcome improvement-no information condition will report
the decision maker's allocations to be more internally caused
(locus of causality) and controllable (locus of control) than
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition.

By not

providing the subject with any additional attributional
information in the form of feedback, except what can be gleaned
from the outcome.allocations, it is hypothesized that the outcome
improvements would indicate that the decision maker has outcome
control and that the initially depressed outcomes are not
justified by contextual factors.
The ratings of both distributive and procedural fairness are
expected to covary as a function of attributions on these
dimensions.

That is, lower perceived justice should be caused by

perceptions that the decision maker not only has control, but that
the basis for the allocation is an internal characteristic of the'
decision maker.

At the same time, perceptions of greater fairness

should result from perceptions that the decision maker has less
control and that the cause of the inequitable outcomes is
contextually based.

This difference in attributional perceptions

is hypothesized to account for the frustration effect.

The second

and third hypotheses deal with the experimental manipulation of
these attributions to establish their causal impact on perceptions
of fairness.
The second hypothesis is that subjects in the outcome
constant-controllable information condition should rate both
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procedural and distributive fairness lower than subjects in the
outcome improvement-controllable information condition.

In both

the outcome constant and the outcome improvement conditions, the
ratings of fairness should reflect the equity of the outcomes when
attributions are controlled by feedback.

Thus, attributional

perceptions which are manipulated through feedback should remain
constant in both the outcome constant and outcome improvement
conditions resulting in perceptions of fairness that mirror the
equity of the outcomes.

Previous research has failed to control

the variation of attributions in these two conditions.
Finally, the third hypothesis is that subjects in the outcome
constant-uncontrollable information condition should rate
distributive and procedural justice higher than subjects in the
outcome constant-controllable information condition.

Subjects who

do not receive any outcome improvement- should be more willing to
accept their unfair outcomes if they feel the decision maker does
not have -much control over the outcome allocations.
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Method
Subjects
In exchange for extra credit toward grades in introductory
psychology, 104 subjects were solicited from the University of
Nebraska at Omaha.

Subjects, who volunteered, were randomly

assigned to one of five experimental conditions.

Four subjects

had to be eliminated from the experiment for one of three reasons.
One subject did not speak English well enough to be able to follow
the procedures as outlined.

Another subject had to be eliminated

because he chose not to make any voice statements to the decision
maker, thus, it was impossible to provide him with any feedback
from the manager about his voiced statement.

Finally, two

subjects stated they knew no manager existed and that they were
being exposed to a scam.

The last two subjects made these

statements prior to debriefing, thus, their data were eliminated
from further analyses.
Procedure
Subjects were solicited using bulletin board sign up sheets.
At the scheduled time, subjects were placed in separate rooms
where they were asked to read and sign a consent form.

.Because

two subjects were run at a time, each subject was escorted to a
room as they arrived so that they were unaware that another
subject was being run at the same time.
Subjects were informed that the purpose of the experiment was
to assess simple cognitive performance abilities in a business
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simulation task.

It was explained that these cognitive abilities

were being measured by performance on a schedule-creating task.
The subjects were also informed that to make the business
simulation more realistic $60.00 had been set aside from which
they would be compensated for their work.

As this did not amount

to enough money for everyone to share, a lottery was held with
three winners each receiving $20.00 prizes.
The subjects were informed that for each of six task
performance sessions they would receive a certain number of
lottery tickets.

A random drawing of the tickets determined the

three different prize winners.

It was stressed that because each

ticket had an equal probability of being selected it was to the
advantage of each subject to have as many tickets as possible.
Subjects were led to believe that a total of twelve tickets
were available for each task session, and that they were to be
divided between a "manager" and "worker" as the manager saw fit.
In reality, the ticket distribution followed one of two set
schedules outlined in Table 1.

The role of manager and worker was

also fixed, but all subjects believed

that they had

beenrandomly

selected to play the role of worker.
After the lottery, the ticket distribution process, and the
task had been explained, subjects were asked to select one of two
pieces of paper to determine who would play the role of manager
and worker for the six task, sessions.

The subjects

that the two pieces of paper had "manager"

wereinformed

or "worker" written on
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'Table 1
Ticket Distribution Schedule

Distribution
Trial,
No Change

Worker Manager

Change

worker Manager

#1

3

9

3

9

#2

3

9

3

9

#3

3

9

3

9

#4

3

9

4

8

*5

3

9

4

8

#6

3

9

4

8

Total

18

54

21

51

.
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them to determine who played which role.

Because both slips of

paper had "worker" written on them, the subject always assumed the
role of worker.
After the role designation had been completed, the subjects
were given instructions for the task and asked to complete a fair
payment card.

The subjects were instructed to write on the fair

payment card what they perceived to be a fair distribution of the
lottery tickets.

It was explained that since each person had an

equal chance at playing either role, most people write down an
even split as being fair.
At this point subjects were asked to begin performing the
first of six 5-minute task performance sessions.

At the

completion of the first session, performance was documented by
counting the number of classes that subjects had scheduled.

The

experimenter then left the room allegedly to inform the manager
how many classes the worker had scheduled and to ascertain the
number of tickets that the manager had allocated the worker for
that task session.

Upon returning to the room, subjects were

informed of the number of tickets the manager had allocated to
them for the previous task session and the number of schedules
created by the manager.

The next task performance session then

began.
For the first session subjects were always informed that they
had scheduled one less class than the manager; for the second
session, one more; the third the same number as the manager; the
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fourth one more; the fifth the same; and in the last session the
subjects were informed that they had scheduled one less class than
the manager.

All performance measurements, and information about

the allocations were relayed to the subject in the same manner as
was done during the first session.
Before the fourth task, performance session, subjects were
told that in order to more closely simulate a true business
context they were now being given an opportunity to provide
feedback to the manager.

They were told that they should write

down on a piece of paper what they thought of the previous ticket
allocations and what they thought would be a fair distribution in
the future.

In addition, they could also write down any other

comments they wanted to make to the manager.
The opinions, of the subjects were then collected, and they
were led to believe that the experimenter was going to give them
to the manager to.read.

For subjects in feedback conditions, the

feedback from the manager was provided to them approximately five
minutes after the opinions were collected.

Following this, the

remaining task performance sessions were completed.

After the

sixth performance session the subjects were asked to complete a
questionnaire which assessed their perceptions of the'dependent
variables.
Tasks
Each subject was asked to create student schedules in each of
the six 5-minute performance sessions.

For each schedule created
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it was necessary for the subject to assess

theclasses that a

hypothetical student still needed based on

theclasses that he or

she had already taken.
Subjects were provided with a series of forms containing
information pertinent to schedules that needed to be created.
Each form contained a list of classes the student had already
completed along with times the student had available to attend
classes.

For simplicity, subjects were informed that the forms

had been sorted by the students' year in school, and that they
were only going to work on schedules for students who were
sophomores.
A separate list of the classes which each student shouldhave
completed by the end of the sophomore year

wasalso provided.

Combining all this information, subjects were told to write down
on a lined piece of paper the student's identification number,
class call number and name of the classes for which the student
could reasonably be expected to register.

Each student was to be

scheduled for 12 to 15 hours worth of classes.

The information

about class time and dates were obtained from a copy of a
previously used class schedule at the University.

While working

as rapidly as possible, subjects were asked to write both legibly
and accurately insuring that there were no conflicts in the
created schedules.
Independent Variables
Subjects were exposed to one of three responses by the
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manager to their voiced opinion, along with either a slight
improvement or no change in outcome after voice.

These conditions

resulted in a 2 x 3 incomplete factorial design.
The three different types of responses were: no information,
a written statement stating "you're right, but I want to keep the
tickets for myself," or the written statement "you may be right,
but I can't change now.” In the no information conditions subjects
did not receive any feedback from the manager about the opinions
they expressed.

Thus, this manipulation replicates previous

studies (e.g. Folger, 1977) of the outcome variable and was
designed to provide ratings against which the effects of the
attribution variable could be assessed.
In the controllable information, condition subjects received a
message from the manager indicating that the manager acknowledges
what the worker has pointed out is correct.

Although the

statement indicated that the manager agreed with the worker and „
that the manager wanted to keep the tickets, no mention of any
outcome changes was made in this statement.
In the uncontrollable information condition subjects were
told that the ticket outcomes could not now be changed.

No

reference to whether the manager thought the worker was right was
made.

Again, no mention of future outcomes was made, the

statement simply addressed the opinion expressed by the worker.
In addition to the response by the manager to voice, the
outcomes after voice were manipulated.

In the no change
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condition, the proportion of the allocations the subject received
after the expression of voice did not change.

In contrast,

subjects in the change condition received outcomes that improved
after they voiced their opinion.

The outcomes after voice were

not a restoration of equity, but they were a moderate improvement
over outcomes received before voice.
schedules are listed in Table 1.

The ticket distribution

Because it was illogical for

subjects to be told their outcomes could not be changed and then
receive improvement in outcomes, this cell of the design was not
run.
Dependent Variables
The major dependent variables were collected using a
questionnaire following the sixth task performance session
(Appendix A) . Along with a series of questions dealing with how
strenuous the task was perceived to be, the subjects were asked
how fair they thought the manager was in dividing the outcomes,
how fair they felt the outcomes were, how much control they felt
the manager had in deciding the outcomes, and the amount of
consideration they felt the manager gave to their .voiced opinion.
Each of these items was assessed using an 11-point Likert-type
scale.
Covariate Assessment
After the experiment was run and some preliminary analysis
had been completed, it became obvious that a large amount of
within treatment variability existed in the data.

In order to
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increase the power of the statistical analyses a suitable
covariate was needed.

Because subjects' voiced statements were

made prior to the manipulation of the independent variables, it is
acceptable to use information contained in the voiced statements
as a covariate.

Two of the dependent variables are procedural and

distributive justice.

Thus, assessing perceptions of fairness

which existed at the time of voice should not only be linked to
later perceptions of fairness, but it may also be used to factor
out some of the within-treatment variability increasing the power
of the statistical analyses.

An acceptable method of obtaining

these perceptions of fairness was needed.
Using the subjects' voiced statements as a source, two raters
evaluated the amount of outcome dissatisfaction portrayed by each
subject.

This was completed using a one to five scale with one

being the most unfair.

The raters, blind to experimental

condition, had met prior to the ratings to agree on a few loosely
defined benchmarks, however, these ratings were primarily
subjective evaluations.

Further discussion of the covariate will

follow in the discussion of the results.
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Results
lyianipulation Check
To determine if attributions differed as a result of the
feedback given, subjects were asked how much the manager
considered only his or her own interest.
designed to assess locus of causality.

This question was
All subjects perceived the

manager to consider only his or her own interests in the outcome
allocations as is evident by the high mean values for all the
experimental conditions (see Table 2).

As anticipated, subjects

who received the controllable information (both outcome constant
and outcome changing conditions) perceived the manager to consider
only his or her own interest more (M=10.13) than did subjects who
were given the uncontrollable information (M=8.80)(using an
11-point scale).

An Analysis of Variance on these mean

differences was significant (F(l,95)=8.89, pc.01).
Subjects were also asked how much influence they thought the
manager had over the outcomes.

This additional question was also

intended to serve as a manipulation check by assessing perceived
locus of control.

Again, perceptions of managerial control over

the outcomes was very high for all conditions (see Table 3).
Subjects in the controllable information (both outcome constant
and outcome changing) conditions perceived the manager to have
greater control over the outcomes (M=10.30) than did those in the
uncontrollable information condition (M=9.79).

While this

difference is in the anticipated direction, it failed to attain
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus of Causality (Question 15)
(To what extent did the Manager consider his or her own interest?)

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Outcome Condition

Constant

Improvement

M

9.18

8.84

(SD)

(2.01)

(2.01)

M

10.35

9.90

(SD)

(0.93)

(1.52)

M.
(SD)

8.80
(1.39)

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate the manager
considered only his or her own interest.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus of Control (Question 14)
(How much influence did manager have over ticket distributions?)

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Outcome Condition

Constant

Improvement

M

10.36

10.41

(SD)

(0.88)

(1.15)

M

10.18

10.44

(SD)'

(1.87)

(1.28)

M

9.79

(SD)

(1.94)

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate the manager
had a lot of influence over the tickets.

44
statistical significance (F(l,95)=1.63, n.s.).

Further discussion

of locus of control perceptions will follow.
An additional, but slightly different locus of control
question asked subjects how much control they personally felt they
♦

had over the outcomes.

This question does not directly address

any of the stated hypotheses.

An ANOVA on this question failed to

reach statistical significance for feedback information
(F(2,95)=1.96, n.s.), attained significance for outcome change
(F(1,95)=5.62, p<.05), and did not reach significance for the
interaction (F(1,95)=1.79, n.s.).

The manipulation of outcome

change resulted in subjects in the outcome improvement condition
perceiving themselves to have greater control over their outcomes
(M=3.08) than did subjects who received constant outcomes
(M=2.06).

However, the overall mean (M=2.47) indicates that they

did not perceive themselves to have a great deal of control over
their outcomes (see Table 4).
Subjects were also asked how hard they felt the manager
worked relative to their own effort.

The grand mean for all five

conditions was M=5.64 (SD=1.04) indicating that they perceived the
manager had expended just as much effort as they had at the task.
Again, no specific hypotheses deal with this question.

An ANOVA

was conducted to determine if these perceptions differed by
condition.

This analysis failed to attain statistical

significance for feedback information (F(2,95)<1, n.s.), for
allocation amount (F(1,95)<1, n.s.), nor for their interaction
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Locus ol Control (Question 9)
(How much influence did you have over ticket outcomes?)

Attribution Condition

Mo Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information.

Outcome Condition

Constant

Improvement

M

2.63

2.95

(SD)

(2.76)

(2.65)

M

1.60

3.21

(SD)

(1.54)

(1.93)

M

1.96

(SD)

(1.57)

note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very little
influence.
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(F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
Concluding from the manipulation checks, the feedback was not
entirely effective in altering attributions.

Subjects'

perceptions of the cause of the outcome distribution were
successfully manipulated, but their perceptions of the amount of
managerial control over the outcomes were not.

Thus, if

perceptions of fairness are altered by the attribution information
about the manager, only locus of causality can be assumed to have
caused those changes.

It remains to be seen whether changes in

locus of causality are enough to alter perceptions of fairness.
Attributional Change
The first hypothesis was that subjects in the no information
conditions should attribute greater responsibility for the outcome
allocations to the manager when the outcomes change as opposed to
when they remain the same.

This should be manifested in the

perception that the manager had greater control over and displayed
more self-interest (locus of causality) in the outcome allocations
when the outcomes improved only slightly.
When asked how much they felt the manager considered only his
or her self-interest, subjects in the outcome improvement-no
information condition perceived that the manager was slightly less
concerned with his or her self-interest (M=8.84) than did the
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition
(M=9.19).

However, this difference in attributions was not
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statistically significant (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
Subjects were asked how much control they felt the manager
had over' the outcomes received to assess locus of control.

As

anticipated, subjects who were given outcome improvements without
any feedback reported the manager to have greater control over the
allocations (M=10.41) than did those who were not given any
outcome change and did not receive any feedback (M=10.36).

Again,

however, this mean difference is not statistically significant
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.) nor is it practically significant.
Both the locus- of control and locus of causality measures
fail to support the first hypothesis.

Demonstrating that the

attribution model does not explain the frustration effect requires
an assessment of whether the frustration phenomenon actually
occurred in this study.

Failure to attain a pattern of fairness

perceptions that mirror the frustration effect would mean the
displayed attributions may be unrelated to the phenomenon because
it did not occur.
Distributive Justice
Eliciting the frustration effect in distributive justice
perceptions is an important prerequisite to studying the causes of
this phenomenon.

To assess this dimension, subjects were asked

how satisfied they were with the outcomes they received and how
fair were the ticket distributions.
questions are in Table 5 and Table 6.

The mean ratings for these
The reliability of these

two questions was assessed using their mean within-cell
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations o£ Dist. Justice (Question 11)
(How satisfied are you with the number of tickets received?)

'Outcome Condition

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Constant

Improvement

M

8.75

7.59

(SD)

(2.36)

(2.64)

M

9.23

9.00

(SD)

(1.49)

(2.03)

M

7.86

(SD)

(2.77)

note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very satisfied.
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Dist. Justice (Question 19)
(How fair was the ticket distribution?)

Outcome Condition

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

uncontrollable Information

Constant

Improvement

3.15

3.39

(SD)

(2.16)

(1.92)

M

2.66

3.15

(SD)

(1.59)

(2.18)

M

2.74

(SD)

(1.39)

M

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very fair.
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correlation.

This procedure controls the variability that results

from experimental manipulation which may artificially inflate the
reliability coefficient.

The within-cells correlation between

these two questions was £=.59 justifying their combined use as a
measure of distributive fairness.
The first hypothesis stated that subjects, in the outcome
improvement-no information condition should rate satisfaction and
fairness lower than those in the outcome constant-no information
condition.

Subjects' satisfaction with the ticket distributions

was actually higher in the outcome improvement-no information
condition (M=7.59) than it was in the outcome constant-no
information condition (M=8.75)(this item is reversed scored).
Similarly, perceptions of outcome fairness were also higher in the
outcome improvement-no information condition (M=3.39) than they
were in the outcome constant-no information condition (M=3.15),
but the magnitude of this difference is very small.

Thus,

satisfaction and perceived fairness had similar while differing
patterns of mean ratings for’these two conditions.
A MANOVA on this contrast using both the satisfaction and
perceived outcome fairness questions failed to attain statistical
significance (F(2,94)=1.48, n.s.).

The univariate analysis for

both satisfaction (F(1,95)=2.55, n.s.) and perceived fairness
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.) were also, not statistically significant.
Unfortunately, the frustration effect was not elicited in the
perceptions of distributive justice.

This results in an inability
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to test an attributional explanation of the frustration phenomenon
in this study.

However, it is possible to conduct further

analysis to determine whether perceptions of distributive fairness
are affected by attributional information and outcome changes as
predicted by the second and third hypothesis.
The second hypothesis was that subjects in the outcome
constant-controllable information condition should rate procedural
justice lower than subjects in the outcome improvementcontrollable information condition.

This hypothesis was based on

the assumption that when attributions are controlled by the
feedback information, the distributive justice perceptions reflect
the equity of the allocations.
Subjects were only slightly less satisfied with the outcomes
in the outcome constant-controllable information condition
(M=9.23) than were subjects in the outcome improvementcontrollable information condition (M=9.00)(again, this item is
reversed scored).

The ratings of- outcome fairness elicited the

same pattern: subjects in the outcome constant-controllable
information condition (M=2.66) reporting less fairness than,
subjects in the outcome improvement-controllable information
condition (M=3.15).
A MANOVA on these mean differences failed to reach
significance (F(2,94)<1, n.s.).

Both a univariate ANOVA on

satisfaction (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and on perceived fairness
(F{1,95)<1, n.s.) also failed to attain statistical significance.
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‘I’hus, while the mean differences were consistent with the second
hypothesis, no reliable difference was found on perceptions of
distributive justice when attributions were controlled and
*

outcomes vary.
Finally, the third hypothesis was that subjects who were not
given any outcome changes would rate distributive justice higher
when they were provided with uncontrollable as opposed to
controllable information.

The perception that the manager did not

have any control over the outcomes should lead them to rate the
outcomes as more fair.
Subjects asked about their satisfaction with the outcomes
were more satisfied in the outcome constant-uncontrollable
information condition (M=7.86) than were subjects in the outcome
constant-controllable information condition (M=9.00)(again,
reverse scored). The perceptions of outcome fairness were
somewhat different.

While subjects in the outcome constant-

uncontrollable information condition rated outcome fairness higher
(M=2.74) than those in the outcome constant-controllable
information condition (M=2.66), the mean differences between these
two conditions is not as great.
A MANOVA on the mean difference between the outcome constantuncontrollable information and the outcome constant-controllable
information conditions was statistically significant
(F{2,94)=3.66, p<.05).

While the univariate analysis of

satisfaction reached significance (F(1,95)=3.93, p=.05) for this
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contrast, the univariate analysis of perceived outcome fairness
did not (E(1,95)<1, n.s.).

Thus, while perceptions of

satisfaction were-influenced by the type of feedback received,
perceptions of outcome fairness were not.
The perception of distributive fairness is not the only
dimension on which the frustration effect manifests itself.

In

previous research (e.g. Folger-, 1977; Folger et al., 1979), the
perception of procedural justice has also been influenced by the
frustration effect.
Procedural Justice
Perceptions of procedural justice were assessed by asking
subjects how biased the manager was in the way that he or she
distributed the tickets and to what extent the ticket allocation
procedure favored the manager.

The within-cells correlation of

these two questions was rather low (r=.34), therefore, both will
be assessed separately.

The cell means for how biased the manager

was are reported in Table 7, and the means for how much the
procedures favored the manager are reported in Table .8.
Again, to support the first hypothesis the frustration effect
should result in lower perceptions of procedural justice in the
outcome improvement-no information condition than in the outcome
constant-no information condition.

Perceptions of bias indicated

that subjects in the outcome improvement-no information condition
felt the manager was less biased (M=3.90) than did subjects in the
outcome constant-no information condition (M=2.96), opposite of
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviation on Procedural Justice (Question 17)
(How biased was the ticket distribution procedure?)

Outcome Condition

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Constant

Improvement

M

2.96

3.90

(5D)

(2.16)

(2.32)

M

3.80

.3.41

(SD)

(3.85)

(2.32)

M

4.60

(SD)

(3.15)

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very unbiased.

Table 8
Means and Standard Deviation on Procedural Justice (Question 18)
(How much did the distribution procedure favor the manager?)

Outcome Condition

Attribution Condition

Mo Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Constant

Improvement

M

2.01

2.05

(SD)

(1.79)

(1.57)

M

1.46

1.81

(SD)

(0.84)

(1.68)

M

2.33

(SD)

(1.91)

note: 11-point scale where lower values indicate very favorable
to the manageri
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their predicted directions.

However, this mean difference failed

to attain a statistical level of significance (F(l,95)=l.10,
n.s.).
Measures of the extent to which the ticket procedures favored
the manager did not reflect the same perceptions.

Subjects in the

outcome improvement-no information condition felt the procedures
favored the manager less (M=2.Q5) than did subjects in the outcome
constant-no information condition (M=2.01).

However, these are

not practically significant differences and they also fail to
attain statistical significance (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).

Thus, neither

question related to perceptions of fairness support the first
hypothesis.
The second hypothesis, that procedural fairness should be
influenced by the outcomes when attributions were controlled, also
failed to receive any support from the measures of procedural
fairness.

More bias was reported by subjects in the outcome

improvement-controllable information condition (M=3.41) than
subjects in the outcome constant-controllable information
condition (M=3.80).

This result is opposite to that which was

predicted, but it failed to reach statistical significance
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.).

Subjects also felt that the procedures favored

the manager more in the outcome constant-controllable information
condition (M=1.46) than in the outcome improvement-controllable
information condition (M=1.81).

This result is also opposite to

that which was predicted, and it also failed to reach statistical
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significance (F(l,95)<1, n.s.).
To determine whether any support existed for the third
hypothesis, mean differences between the outcome constantcontrollable information and outcome constant-uncontrollable
information conditions were studied.

Subjects in the outcome

constant-controllable information condition perceived the manager
to be more biased (M=3.80) than did the subjects in the outcome
improvement-uncontrollable information condition (M=4.60j.

This

difference, while in the anticipated direction, was not
statistically significant (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).

Subjects also felt

‘
chat, the procedures favored the manager more in the outcome
constant-controllable information condition (M=1.46) than in the
outcome constant-uncontrollable information condition (M=2.33).
Again, the means are as predicted but they failed to reach a level
of statistical significance (F(1,95)=2.90, n.s.).

Thus, the third

hypothesis also fails to receive any support in perceptions of
procedural fairness.
Subjects were asked to answer one additional question dealing
■with procedural justice.

This question, however, asked subjects

their perception of how fair it was to allow the manager to decide
how many tickets the worker received.

In general, subjects felt

that this procedure was neither fair nor unfair as evidenced by
M=5.82 (SD=2.92)V This question deals with a different type of
procedural justice, one not under the manager's control.
the hypotheses deal specifically with this question.

None of

Again, a
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factorial ANOVA was used in the analysis.

This analysis failed to

reach significance for feedback information (F(2,95)<1, n.s.), for
outcome change (F(1,95)<1, n.s.), and their interaction
(F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
while perceptions of distributive and procedural fairness are
the most predominantly utilized measures in the frustration effect
research (e.g. deCarufel & Schopler, 1979; Folger, 1977, Folger et
al., 1979), Conlon et al. (1989) recently demonstrated that
perceptions of due consideration also manifest the frustration
effect pattern.

With this in mind, the subjects' perceptions of

whether they were given due consideration were also assessed in
this study.
Due Consideration
Perceptions of due consideration were assessed by asking
subjects how considerate and how understanding was the manager.
The within-cells correlation between these two measures was r=.63
justifying their combined use in MANOVA.

The means for the

consideration question are reported in Table 9 and the means for
the understanding question are reported in Table 10.
If the first hypothesis were extended to due consideration,
it would predict a drop in due consideration in the outcome
improvement-no information condition as compared to the outcome
constant-no information condition.
manifested for both questions.

Just the opposite pattern was

Subjects in the outcome

improvement-no information condition perceived the manager to be
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 8)
(How considerate was the manager?)

Outcome Condition

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Constant

Improvement

M

3.21

4.13

(SD)

(2.18)

(1.66)

M

2.77

3.21

(SD)

(1.53)

(1.60)

M

3.42

(SD)

(1.86)
*

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very
considerate.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 12)
(How understanding was the manager?)

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Outcome Condition

Constant

Improvement

3.34

4.53

(SD)

(1.98)

(2.02)

M

3.03

3.70

(SD)

(2.20)

(2.34)

M

3.54

(SD)

(2.20)

m

'

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate very
understanding
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more considerate (14=4.13) than subjects in the outcome constant-no
•information condition (M=3.21).

The manager was also perceived to

be more understanding in the outcome improvement-no information
condition (M=4.53) than in the outcome constant-no information
condition (M=3.34).

These mean differences failed to reach a

statistically significant level when analyzed using MANOVA
(F(2,94)=1.69, n.s.).

Both the univariate analysis for

consideration (F{1 ,95)=2.63, n.s.) and understanding
(F(1,95)=3.04, n.s.) also failed to reach significance.
Extending the second hypothesis to due consideration would
result in the prediction that subjects in the controllable
information conditions would rate consideration higher if they
were provided outcome improvements as opposed to no outcome
change.

Consistent with this prediction subjects perceived the

manager to be more considerate in the outcome improvementcontrollable information condition (M=3.21) than in the outcome
constant-controllable information condition (M=2.78).

This same

pattern exists in perceptions of managerial understanding with the
outcome improvement-controllable information condition resulting
in higher ratings (M=3.70) than the outcome constant-controllable
information condition (M=3.03).

An ANOVA on these mean

differences failed to be statistically significant at the
multivariate level (F(2,94)<1, n.s.) and both univariate levels
for consideration (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and understanding (F(1,95)<1,
n.s.).

Again, perceptions of due consideration are not supportive
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of the second hypothesis.
Finally, the third hypothesis would predict that due
consideration would be higher with the uncontrollable information
feedback than with the controllable information feedback when the
outcomes did not change.

Both perceived consideration and

understanding were consistent with this hypothesis.

However,

subjects in the outcome constant-controllable information
condition rated consideration only slightly lower (M=2.78) than
those in the outcome constant-uncontrollable information condition
(M=3.43).

Likewise, managerial understanding was perceived to be

only slightly lower in the outcome constant-controllable
information condition (M=3.03) than in the outcome constantuncontrollable information condition (M=3.54).
Again, the multivariate analysis failed to reach statistical
significance (F(2,95)<1, n.s.).

The univariate analysis also

failed to reach statistical significance for both the
consideration question (F(1,95)<1, n.s.) and the understanding
question (F(1,95)<1, n.s.).
One additional question assessed how much subjects felt the
manager listened to what they had to say.

This question is

different than the other two due consideration questions in that
the question merely asks whether the manager listened to what was
said rather than how much it was considered.

Thus, an ANOVA was

used in the analysis rather than specific, planned comparisons.
In this analysis the effect for feedback was not significant
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(F(2,95)<1, n.s.)/ the main effect for outcome change was
significant (F(l,95)=4.49, p<.05),-and the interaction was not
(F(1,95)=2.91, n.s.).

Subjects in the outcome improvement

conditions reported that the manager listened to them more
(M=4.13) than did.subjects in the outcome constant conditions
(M=2.23).

Again, the overall mean (M=2.99) indicates.that the

manager did not listen a lot to what was said (see Table 11).
However, subjects provided with improving outcomes did feel the .
manager listened to them more.
In summary, while the perceptions of managerial consideration
and understanding were not affected by the manipulations,
perceptions of .how much the manager listened was .altered by
outcome improvements but not by the type of feedback information
provided.
Analysis of Covariance
As noted before, a high level of within-treatment variability
exists which reduces the power of the statistical analysis.

In an

effort to remove some of this variance, an analysis of covariance
was utilized..

The covariate was computed from two independent

raters' evaluations of how unfairly the subject felt that he or
she was treated in the three initial allocations.

These ratings

.•■/ere based on each subjects' voiced statements.
Each subjects' voiced statements were rated on a 1 to 5
scale, where 1 is the most unfair.

Rater #1 had a mean rating of

3.64 and a standard deviation of 1.02 across subjects while rater
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Table 11
Weans and standard Deviations for Due Consideration (Question 10)
(How much did the manager listen?)

Attribution Condition

No Information

Controllable Information

Uncontrollable Information

Outcome Condition

Constant

Improvement

M

1.53

4.60

(SD)

(1.71)

(2.34)

M

2.21

3.65

(SD)

(1.77)

(2.66)

M
(SD)

2.94
(2.10)

note: 11-point scale where higher values indicate listened a lot
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u2 had a mean rating of 2.87 and a standard deviation of 1.02.
The .inter-rater reliability coefficient was r=.54.

In order to

give equal weighting to each raters' evaluations, each rater's
rating was standardized across subjects and then the mean of the
two standardized ratings for each subject was computed.

The mean

of the standardized rating then served as the covariate.
Stevens (1986, p. 298) points out three prerequisites to the
appropriate use of an Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA).

First, the

covariate itself must not be affected by the manipulation of the
independent variables.

In this particular experiment, the

independent variables were never administered until after the
subjects voiced their opinions.

Because ratings of subject's

voiced statements were used as the covariate, it was impossible
for the covariate to be affected by experimental condition; thus,
this assumption is-satisfied.
Second, the covariate must be linearly related to the
dependent variable.

To ascertain whether this assumption is met

requires regressing each dependent variable on the covariate while
controlling for experimental condition.

The within-cells

regression equation is then tested for its significance indicating
whether the covariate and the dependent variables.are linearly
related.

If a linear relationship exists, the second assumption

is satisfied.
Third, the regression of the dependent variables on the
covariate must be the same for each treatment condition.

In order
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to ascertain whether this assumption is met, Stevens recommends
the independent variabie-covariate interaction term .be assessed
for its significance on the dependent variable.

If the

interaction analysis turns out to be significant, this assumption
has not been met.

Failure to attain significance results in

sufficiently satisfying this, requirement.
The second and third assumption require testing for each of
the dependent variables analyzed.

Only procedural and

distributive justice perceptions are theoretically linked to the
covariate.

Thus, only these two variables can be analyzed with

the ANCOVA procedure, assuming the other requirements have been
met.
Distributive Justice
Testing the second assumption of ANCOVA, the multivariate
within-ceils regression equation was significant (F(2,93)=9.84,
pc.001).

In addition, the univariate regression equation was

significant for both the satisfaction (F(2,93)=7.58, p<.01) and
the perceived fairness question (F(2,93)=19.75, pc.001).

Thus, a

linear relationship between the covariate and the dependent
variables has been established.
A multivariate assessment of the interaction of the
independent variable and the covariate on the dependent variables
failed to obtain significance (F(8,178)<1, n.s.).

The univariate

analyses of the interaction terms were also non-significant for
both the satisfaction (F(4,90)=1.02, n.s.) and the fairness
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question (F(4,90)<1, n.s.).

Based on the criteria established by

Stevens, the regression equations for each condition are similar.
The MANCOVA analysis testing the significance between the
outcome improvement-no information condition and the outcome
constant-no information condition still failed to attain
statistical significance (F(2,93)=1.45, n.s.).

This test of the

first hypothesis resulted in no change with the use of the more
powerful statistical approach.
A MANCOVA testing the difference between the outcome constant
and outcome improvement conditions when controllable feedback
information was given also failed to attain significance
(F(2,93)<1, n.s.).

Thus, the second hypothesis is not supported

even when the more powerful MANCOVA procedure is used to analyze
the data.
Finally, for subjects given constant outcomes, a MANCOVA
between those given the controllable feedback and those given the
uncontrollable feedback failed to attain statistical significance
(F(2,93)=2.39, n.s.).

The third hypothesis also fails to be

supported with MANCOVA, however, it was supported with the
straight ANOVA procedure.

Given the different outcomes, a

decision was made to stick with the MANCOVA results in that it
adjusts for pre-treatment group differences which may have
erroneously inflated the significance of the straight ANOVA.

If

pre-treatment differences existed between the two groups, it would
be more appropriate to use the MANCOVA approach to assess the real
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effects of the manipulations.
in conclusion, the assessment of each of the hypotheses is
not supported using the MANCOVA procedure in the analysis of
distributive justice.
Procedural Justice
Procedural justice was assessed with two separate questions.
The test of the within-cells regression equation for the question
of how biased the manager was in the way he or she distributed
tickets failed to attain statistical significance (F(1,94)=2.02,
n.s.).

Thus, it would be inappropriate to use the. ANCOVA

procedure on the analysis of this question.
The regression of the dependent variable on the covariate for
the question which asked how much the ticket distribution favored
the manager was significant (F(l,94)=9.98, p<.01).

As a result,

the second assumption of ANCOVA was met for this covariate.
The interaction between treatment condition and covariate on
the dependent variable was assessed to test the third
prerequisite.

This interaction failed to reach significance

(F(4.90)<1, n.s.).

Thus, both prerequisites were satisfied.

Again, a test was conducted of the mean differences between
subjects in the outcome constant-no information condition and the
outcome improvement-no information condition.

This analysis

failed to reach statistical significance (F(1,94)<1, n.s.), thus
hypothesis one remains unsupported.
The second hypothesis was tested by contrasting the means
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between those who received outcomes that improved and those that
had outcomes that remained the same when the controllable feedback
information was given.

This analysis also failed to reach

significance (F(1,94)<1, n.s.) which results in hypothesis two not
receiving any support.
An ANCOVA testing the effects of the controllable information
as opposed to the uncontrollable information when outcome are
constant also failed to'attain significance (F(l,94)=2.60, n.s.).
Again, the conclusions surrounding the third hypothesis do not
change as a result of the ANCOVA procedure.
In summary, the results of the procedural justice questions
using an ANCOVA procedure do not result in any substantive changes
regarding each of the hypotheses.

All of the analyses failed to

statistically support the hypotheses.
Summary of Results
The manipulations were only partially effective at altering
attributions.

Specifically, perceptions of locus of causality

were effectively manipulated while perceptions of managerial
control over the outcomes were not significantly altered.
However, the manager was perceived to have a great deal of control
over the outcomes and to consider only his or her own interest in
all conditions.

Subjects perceived they had little control over

the outcome even though some increased personal control was noted
when the outcomes improved.
Unfortunately, perceptions of both procedural and
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distributive justice were not systematically affected by the
experimental manipulations.

-In all conditions subjects felt the

outcomes were both procedurally and distributively unfair as
evidenced by extremely low ratings on these dimensions.
In addition, the perceptions of managerial consideration and
understanding were not affected by the experimental condition.
The perceptions of how much the manager listened was affected by
the improvement in outcomes with those receiving outcome
improvements reporting the manager to have listened more than
those whose outcomes did not change. .
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Discussion
The present study attempted to explain the frustration effect
using an attribution model of achievement motivation and emotion
(Weiner, 1985).

The frustration effect is defined as a decrease

in perceptions of fairness that accompany an increase in outcomes
when the outcome increase is small.
As proposed by Lind and Tyler (1988), this study supported
their statement that the frustration effect is indeed a fragile
phenomenon.

Subjects who received inequitable outcome

distributions rated procedural and distributive fairness in a
positive monotonic fashion with the objective outcome equity.
Even though this rating pattern did not attain statistical
significance, this pattern is inconsistent with previous studies
of the frustration effect where subjects who received increased
outcomes rated fairness lower than those whose outcomes were more
objectively inequitable (e.g. Conlon et al., 1989; Folger, 1977;
Folger et al., 1979).

Unfortunately, these results also limit

further understanding of the cognitive processes that lead to the
frustration phenomenon.
Essential to the investigation of the frustration effect was
lower ratings of fairness by subjects receiving outcome
improvement compared to those receiving no outcome change after
voice.

Although this particular effect is merely a replication of

previous research, the pattern of ratings in this study did not
conform to earlier findings.

In this study subjects initially
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received 3 out of 12 tickets (the manager keeping 9) which changed
to 4 out of 12 (the manager keeping 8) for those given a slight
outcome improvement.

Apparently, this was perceived by the

subjects to be more than a token improvement as evidenced by the
associated rise in fairness ratings.
Lind, and Tyler (1988), while acknowledging the effect is
uncommon, stated the frustration phenomenon is important because
it is inconsistent with theoretical models of procedural justice.
The fact that neither equity theory nor models of procedural
justice are consistent with this phenomenon makes it a likely
candidate for more detailed investigation in order to delineate
the psychological mechanisms responsible for the unusual effect.
Unfortunately, this study confirmed that the frustration effect
may only occur under a unique set of circumstances.
One problem associated with this study may .revolve around
trying to ascertain the specific aspects of fairness that are of
interest.

Asking subjects about the fairness of the ticket

distribution may result in the assessment of different aspects of
fairness depending on how people interpret the question.

It may

not be enough, as was done in this study, to ask how fair were the
ticket distributions.

More specific questions would be needed to

make sure all subjects were thinking about the same thing.
In light of the fact that the frustration effect did not
occur, an analysis of the subjects' attributions takes on less
significance.

Nonetheless, attributional change as a function of
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outcome change was analyzed.

Unfortunately, attributions were not

significantly affected by the subjects' outcomes in the absence of
feedback.

Subjects who received outcomes that changed perceived

the manager as having more control over the outcomes, but this
change was not statistically significant.
In examining the mean differences in the two no-feedback
information cells on locus of control, the possibility of ceiling
effects is evident.

Given the fact that perceptions were so

polarized on this dimension, it would be difficult to distinguish
between perceptions of managerial control of the outcomes even if
they did exist.

An attempt was made to overcome this problem with

the use of an 11-point as opposed to a 7-point Likert-type scale.
The polarization of scores is also a problem elsewhere in
this experiment.

Even though subjects were asked to answer

questions on an 11-point scale, only one-half of this scale was
essentially being used.

All subjects were in situations where

they had been dealt with unfairly, therefore, only the unfair
portion of the scale was used making it difficult to examine,
differences if they did occur.
Another requirement of studying the frustration effect is the
successful manipulation of attributions through feedback. .It is
questionable whether or not this was accomplished in this
particular study.

As evidenced in the manipulation checks,

feedback statements were not as effective at manipulating the
subjects' perceptions of locus of control as they were at
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manipulating perceptions of locus of causality.

It appears

subjects' perceptions of what caused the manager to act the way he
or she did was manipulated while perceptions of the manager's
control over the outcome decision was not.
Because each subject was initially told the manager had total
control over the worker's outcomes, it is possible these
perceptions were not open to further manipulation.

If this were

the case, then measures of locus of control would not change while
measures of locus of causality would still be open to vary as a
function of the type of feedback subjects were given.

This

explanation is also consistent with the "ceiling effect" noted on
the locus of control question that assessed manager control.
The validity of the above argument is somewhat weakened by
the fact that the locus of control question was not written with
as many anchors as was the locus of causality question.

In other

words, if there were no real differences between locus of
causality and locus of control, it may have been difficult to get
parallel results to these two dimensions given the varying number
of anchors used on the two types of questions.' One of the things
that has become clear is that future studies of the frustration
phenomenon, which by their very nature deal with only half of the
attribution and fairness scale, must use many carefully devised
anchors in order to make reliable psychological assessments of the
constructs of interest.
On closer examination, the two questions that deal with
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distributive justice ("How satisfied were you with the,number of
tickets you received?" and "How fair was

the ticket

distribution?") fail to reflect the same

pattern of mean

differences.

the provision of feedback

Satisfaction improved with

which gave an external justification for

the inequitableoutcomes.

However, perceptions of fairness were not affected by the type of
feedback subjects were given.

Previous studies (e.g. Folger,

1977) have found that satisfaction and fairness perceptions lead
to similar results.

In this study, however, it is possible

subjects rated satisfaction based on their subjective experience
of the outcomes and rated fairness more on the objective features
of the outcomes independent of their subjective experience.
This explanation is consistent with the mean differences
between treatment conditions in this study.

Subjects rated the

distributive fairness question in a manner which was parallel to
the actual equity of the outcomes.

In contrast, their

satisfaction with the outcomes revealed a different pattern of
ratings.

Satisfaction, for those provided with feedback, was

consistent with the types of attributions subjects made.
Another problem plaguing this experiment was the high degree
of within subjects variability on many of the questions.

While

certainly some of the variability can be attributed to measurement
weaknesses, some have recently suggested individual differences
exist in perceptions of fairness (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles,
1987).

The argument is that people differ in their sensitivity to
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fairness perceptions.

Three types of people exist: Benevolents,

who prefer their outcome ./'input ratio to he less than that of a
comparison other; Equity Sensitives, who prefer their
outcome/input ratio to be equal to a comparison other; and,
Entitleds who prefer their outcome/input ratio to exceed that of a
comparison other.

Unfortunately, there is no systematic empirical

research to back up this construct, and more research needs to
address this issue if justice research is to be productive.

If

individual differences do exist, it will be necessary to
methodologically or statistically control these differences in
future research.
It should also be noted that studies of the frustration
phenomenon have only been done in a lab setting.

As of yet, it is

not clear whether the frustration effect actually occurs in the
real world.

It may be the lab provides such tight control over

extraneous variables that the frustration effect can be evoked.
The lack of these artificial controls in natural settings may
result in the absence of the frustration phenomenon.

More

research needs to address how prevalent the frustration effect is
in real life.
Analysis of the frustration effect remains incomplete.

This

study was not decisive in developing an understanding of the
variables that lead to this perplexing phenomenon.

While it has

been clearly established that the frustration effect occurs only
under a unique set of circumstances, research needs to delineate
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exactly what factors lead to a decrease in satisfaction when
improvements in distributions and procedures are made.
Once this is accomplished, then a more thorough understanding
of the generality of equity theory and models of procedural
justice can be entertained.

Until this is accomplished, the

frustration effect will remain an anomaly that lies outside our
present explanations of perceptions of fairness.
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Appendix A

COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE IN A BUSINESS SIMULATION
Please answer the following questions based on the
experiment in which you just participated. Be sure
to follow the directions closely. A nsw er each
q u e s t io n t r u t h f u ll y . {Please circle the number
that best describes your perception.)

The following question address your reactions tQ...the task,
1.

How difficult was it for you to create schedules?

Extremely Very
Easy
Easy
T .........
1.......
1
2

Somewhat
Easy
i

,

|

3

4

5

Neither
r ... 6

Somewhat
Difficult
1
7

1

8

Very
Extremely
Difficult Difficult
r
9

1
1 0

I
1 1

2. To what extent did you have to concentrate to complete the task?
A

Not
at all
I
1

Somewhat
1
2

1
3

1
4

1
5

1
6

Lot
1
7

I

1

i

8

9

1 0

I
1 1

3. How much did you rely on the scratch paper?
Not

A

at all
I
1

Somewhat
i
2

i
3

i
4

i
5

I
6

1
7

1

8

1
9

-

Lot

I
1 0

I
1 1

4. How much did you rely on your memory?
Not

A

at all
I
1

Some
1
2

i
3

T
4

I
5

I
6

Lot
1
7

1

8

1
9

1
1 0

I
1 1

5. How much effort did you put into being accurate?
None

A

at all
1
1

Some
1
2

1
3

1
4

1
5

1
6

1
7

I

8

1
9

Lot
... ,
1
1 0

1 1

6. How much effort did you put into being fast?
A

None

Lot

Some

at ail
1
1

1
2

I
3

I
4

I
5

I
6

I
7

I
8

I
10

I
9

~ I
11

7. How drained (tired) did you feel as a result of making schedules?
Extremely
Tired
I
1

I
2

A Little
Tired

Somewhat
Tired

Very
Tired
I
3

I
4

I
5

I
6

I
7

I
8

I
9

Not at'all
Tired
I
1

0

I
11

S TO P !

IF YOU WERE THE MANAGER, PLEASE SKIP QUESTIONS 8 THROUGH
19 AND ANSW ER QUESTIONS 20 THROUGH 31.
IF YOU WERE THE WORKER, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 8
THROUGH 19 AND SKIP QUESTIONS 20 THROUGH 31.
8. How considerate was the manager?
Extremely
Quite
Inconsiderate Inconsiderate
I
1

I

I
3

2

Quite
Considerate

Neither
l
4

I
5

I
6

I
7

I
8

I
9

Extremely
Considerate

I

i

10

11

9. How much influence did you feel you had over the number of tickets you received?
None
at all

A Great

Some

r ........ i
1

.......i

2

i
3

4

I
5

I
6

Deal
I
7

I
8

I
9

i

i

10

11

10. How much did the manager listen to what you had to say?

None
at all

i
1

A Great
Deal

Some

i
2

.... i “ "
3

I

i
4

5

I
6

I
7

I
8

I
9

i

i

10

11

11.

How satisfied were you with the number of tickets your received?

Extremely Very
Satisfied Satisfied

Somewhat
. Satisfied

Somewhat
Dissatisfied

Neither

Very
Extremely
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied

i

1----1---- i— “ i--- 1---- i----i----1-

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

n

i

9 1 0 1 1

The following question deal with vour perceptions of the manager
12.

How understanding was the manager?

Not
at ali

Somewhat not
Understanding

I
1

I
2

I
3

I
4

Somewhat
Understanding

Neither

I
5

Very
Understanding

i

I

I

I

I

I

6

7

8

9

10

11

13. How hard do you think the manager worked?
Much less

A iittle
less than you

than you
1

T

1

2

" 'I

3

...I

''

4

As hard
as you

A little
more than you

Much more
than you

I

1

1

1

1

5

6

7

8

9

t
10

1
1 1

14. How much influence did you feel that the manager had over the number
of tickets you received?
None
at all

A Great
Deal

Some

I

1

I

I

I

1

1

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

I
9

I
10

I

1 1

15. How much did you feel the manager considered only his or her own interest?
Not
at all

Very
little

1

1

1

2

Somewhat

i
3

I
4

Very Extremely
much so
so

Quite
a bit

Moderately

I

i

i

5

6

7

'

1

8

I
9

I
10

I

1 1

The follow ing questions deal with how fair vou were tre ated in this
experiment,
16.

How fair was it to let the manager decide how many tickets you
received?

Extremely Very
Unfair
Unfair

Somewhat
Unfair

Somewhat
Fair

Neither

Very
Fair

i

i

i

i

i

nr

~ 1

i

i

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

17.

biased

Somewhat

biased

Somewhat

biased

Neither

0

n
1

1

Very

unbiased

Extremely

unbiased

I

i

i

i

i

i

i

“ i

i

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

unbiased

i
1

0

i
1

1

Indicate the extent to which you feel the ticket distribution procedures favored you, the
manager, or neither of you?

It favored
the manager
I
1

i
1

How biased was the manager in the way that he or she distributed the tickets?

Extremely Very

18.

Extremely
Fair

I
2

It favored
neither

Somewhat
the manager

I

1

1

3

4

5

I
6

Somewhat
you
1
7

1
8

It favored
you
1
9

1

I

1 0

1 1

Very
Fair

Extremely
Fair

19. How fair was the ticket distribution?
Extremely Very
Unfair
Unfair
1

2

Somewhat
Unfair
3

4

Somewhat
Fair

Neither
5

6

7

8

9

1 0 1 1

IF YOU WERE THE WORKER STOP HERE!
IF YOU WERE THE MANAGER START HERE!

20. How considerate was the worker?
Extremely
Quite
Inconsiderate Inconsiderate

Quite
Considerate

Neither

l

I

l

I

1- - - - 1

1

1

2

3

4

5

7

6

'—

Extremely
Considerate

I- - - - 1- - - - 1- - - - 1
8

9

1

0

1

1

21. How much influence did you feel you had over the number of tickets you received?
None
at all

A Great
Deal

Some

I

I ...

1

2

I

I

3

I

4

1

5

6

I

I

7

n

I
1 0

I

8

9

11

22. How much did the worker listen to what you had to say?
None
at all

A Great
Deal

Some

i

i

i

i

i

i

i

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

i

I
1 0

i
8

9

I.
1 1

23. How satisfied were you with the number of tickets your received?
Extremely Very
Satisfied Satisfied

I

1...

1

2

Somewhat
Satisfied

1

........."1 "
3

Somewhat
Dissatisfied

Neither

I

4

I

5

1
6

I

7

Very
Extremely
Dissatisfied Dissatisfied

1
8

1

9

1

1 0

1

1

T h e fo l lo w in a Question d e a l with v our DerceDtions of the w o rk e r.
24. How understanding was the worker?
Not
at all
i

Somewhat not
Understanding

j

,

|

1

2

3

4

Somewhat
Understanding
i
■■■■ i

Neither

,

i

5

i

6

7

8

Very
Understanding

9

I

I

1 o

1 1

25. Do you feel the worker worked harder, as hard as, or more than you?
Much less
than you

A little
less than you

As hard
as you

A little
more than you

Much more
than you

I

l

i

i

i

i

1 ...

i

i

i

i

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 0

11

26. How much influence did you feel that the worker had over the number
of tickets you received?
None
at all

A Great
Deal

Some

I

I

I

1

2

3

„

I

I

I

I

l

l

4

5

6

7

8

9

l
1

0

l
1

1

27. How much did you feel the worker considered only his or her own interest?

None
at all

i
1

i
2

Thfi

A Great
Deal

Some

I

I

3

4

f n llo w ir m Q u e s tio n s

I
5

I

I

1

6

7

8

1
10

"1

9

I
1 1

deal with how fair vou were tre a te d in this

e x p e r im e n t ,

28.

How fair was it to let you decide how many tickets you
received?

Unfair

i

i

1

2

29.

Unfair

Unfair

Very

Somewhat

Somewhat

Extremely Very

Fair

Fair

Neither

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

i

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Extremely
Fair

I
11

How impartial were you in the way that you distributed the tickets?

Extremely Very
biased

Somewhat
biased

biased

I
1

I
2

Very

Somewhat
unbiased

Neither

unbiased

I

I

I

I

I

1

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I
10

Extremely
unbiased

I

11

30. Indicate the extent to which you feel the ticket distribution procedures favored you, the
worker, or neither of you?
It favored

Somewhat

the worker

It favored

the worker

I

I

I

i

1

2

3

4

It favored

Somewhat

neither

you

you

" I

I

I

1

1

I

I

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

Very

Extremely

31, How fair was the ticket distribution?
Extremely Very
Unfair

1
1

Somewhat

Unfair

1
2

Somewhat

Unfair

Neither

Fair

Fair

I

I

I

i

i

1

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

I
10

Fair

I

11

•

